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Million: Million: Sawyer et al. v. Administrator

SAWYER el al. v. ADMINISTRATOR OF INJUN JOE*
(Finn, Intervenor)
Supreme Court of Missouri, circa 1841.
ed. 1950)

1 Clem. Lit. 1 (Annotated

DOAKES, J:

The trial judge,' a jury being waived, made the findings of fact recounted
herein. With one exception,a these findings are accepted by this court as
the true facts.
Thomas Sawyer and Huckleberry Finn (hereinafter called Tom and
Huck, respectively), minors residing in St. Petersburg (also known as Hannibal), Missouri, are in possession of $12,000 in gold coins which they claim
to have found in a cavern in this State.
The public administrator of Marion County, appointed pursuant to
statute, 2 seeks to recover these coins as belonging, half to the estate of
the late Injun Joe, who died intestate and without known heirs, and half
to the estate of another intestate decedent having no known heirs, and
herein referred to as a ragged man."
The public administrator appeals from. the lower court judgment
*This material is intended primarily for students. The device of an annotated
report is used to permit citation of cases and statutes subsequent to the assumed date
of the above opinions. Footnotes by the judges are numbered; footnotes by the
annotator (Elmer. M. Million, Associate Professor of Law, New York University
School of Law) are indicated by letters. The assumed date of the trial, 1841,
is based on Mark Twain's statement in 1876 that the events in TOM SAWYER
took place "30 or 40 years ago." Thirty five years before 1876 would be 1841,
hence the Missouri Revised Statutes of 1835 are deemed to have applied at the
time of the trial and at the rendition of the above opinions. Unless otherwise
stated, footnote references to pages are to the "record," alias Mark Twain's Tna
ADVENTURES OF TOM SAWYER (The Modem Library edition). For a more prosaic
account of Tom's and Huck's treasure hunt, see "Tom Sawyer And His Band"
by Albert Bigelow Paine, reprinted in THE ST. NIcHOLAs ANTHOLOGY, pp. 97-101
(1948).
1. The circuit court of Marion county. See Mo. REv. STAT. p. 155 § 8(2)
(1835) id. p. 156 § 15; id. p. 348.
2. Mo. REv. STAT. (1835) p. 64, §§ 1 (each county court may appoint a
public administrator), 8 ("the public administrator to take into his charge.. . the
estate ... when a stranger dies intestate in the county without relations or confidential friends . . . [or] when persons die intestate, without any known heirs,

and administration is not undertaken by some other responsible person; ... ").
3. P. 182. The ragged man drowned (p. 226). As he may have left a
widow and children (185) they would be entitled to his share, if any, but their
existence has not been proved. Guardians were appointed by the court for the
infant defendants. See Mo. REv. STAT. p. 456, § 24 (1835).
a. See opinions of Moakes and Oakes, JJ.
(27)
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awarding the disputed coins to Tom and Huck. Finn, the intervenor, appealed from the refusal of the trial court to order Mrs. Douglas, Huck's
guardian, to turn over to Finn the portion of the coins being held by Mrs.
Douglas for Finn's son Huck.4
No one knows the identity of the last previous lawful owner of any
of these coins.5 The coins formerly belonged to a person or persons now
unknown and, although this is merely conjecture, may have been stolen
from them by Murrell's gang. The coins were buried beneath the fireplace
of the "haunted house" on Cardiff Hill near Hannibal. Whether the person secreting the- coins beneath the fireplace intended to come back for
them cannot be positively known, but presumably he did so intend, since
otherwise an open field or the forest or a deep stream would probably have
been used as a more convenient place to get rid of incriminating evidence.
The inference seems clear, therefore, that the unknown person hid the coins
and intended to return for them, not abandon them.0
If the unknown lawful owner hereafter appears, he may obtain his
coins upon proving his title to them, provided he brings his action within
the period fixed by law,7 that period being measured from the date of Tom
and Huck's discovery and removal of the coins from the cave.d The statute
4. P. 242.

5. For that matter, no one knows the identity of any former lawful owner
of the money, last or otherwise. But, even if a former owner other than the last
were known, such owner could assert no rights here, once it was conceded that
he finally and validly passed the ownership of the money on to someone else. Although it is said that, as between successive possessors, the one prior in time prevails, this does not alter the rule that once a person has irrevocably divested himself of all interest in a res, he is thereafter a total stranger to it, insofar as concerns
any attempt by him to claim any right in it by virtue of that former ownership.b
6. Cf. Kershaw's Ex'rs. v. Boykin, 1 Brev. 301 (S. C. Law, 1803) (abandonment by a state of rights in slave not presumed from mere lapse of time).C
7. Mo. REv. STAT. p. 397 (1835).
b. Accord: Enno-Sander Mineral Water Co. v. Fishman, 127 Mo. App. 207,
104 S.W. 1156 (1907) (semble); Wyman v. Hurlburt, 12 Ohio 81, 40 Am. Dec.
461 (1843); Davis v. Butler, 6 Calif. 510 (1856); Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co.
v. Lehigh Valley Coal Co., 294 Pa., 47, 143 Adt. 474 (1928), noted 77 U. PA. L. REv.
549 (1929).
c. Burden of proving abandonment is upon him who asserts it. Tayon v.
Ladew, 33 Mo. 205 (1862) (abandonment of land, under Spanish law). But
see New York, etc. R. Co. v. Haws, 56 N. Y. 175 (1874), criticized in Aigler,
Rights of Finders,21 Micm. L. REv. 664, 666 n. 10 (1923).
d. Whatever the rule as to finders of "lost" goods, the limitation statute
clearly should run in favor of Tom and Huck, as they held openly and as owners,
not tentatively. Riesman, Possession and the Law of Finders 52 HARv. L. REv.
1105, 1108 (1939) declares: "Since the finder ordinarily holds tentatively rather
than adversely, it would seem the statute of limitations would never run." One
of the cases cited, Meekins v. Simpson, 176 N. C. 130, 96 S.E. 894 (1918), held
that the Statute did not start in favor of one who openly held a strayed dogo
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol16/iss1/7
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of limitations would never have run against the true owner while the coins
remained hidden and the whereabouts of the thief remained unknown.,
The present decision does not bar the unknown former owner (technically,
the unknown present owner).
Murrell is not shown to have had any connection with the coins.9
But, if he or his representative appeared and proved that Murrell had
hidden them in the haunted house, this court would have to decide whether
an outlaw may recover possession of loot he had hidden, as against another
8. Mo. REv. STAT. p. 396 (1835).
9. Injun Joe agreed when his companion suggested Murrell hypothetically
(p. 185), but this was mere speculation, neither having any actual knowledge nor
any basis for an admissible opinion.e Moreover, the statements were unswom
and, the parties being dead, were available to the court only as hearsay.
until either a demand and refusal or unequivocal acts of ownership by the finder
inconsistent with the rights of the true owner. The case is weakened as precedent
by the finder's testimony that he was holding in subordination to the true owner,
and the court distinguished with approval an earlier decision, Blount v. Parker,
78 N. C. 128 (1878), as having held that the Statute did begin from the time
the finder sold the found goods, such sale being "an undoubted conversion." Under
these decisions, Tom and Huck deserved the benefit of the Statute, since their
find was immediately "put out at interest" by Judge Thatcher and Widow Douglas,
this in effect being a sale to each borrower. Tom and Huck would have taken
comfort from Baugh v. Williams Adm'r, 264 Ky. 167, 94 S.W. 2d 330 (1936), which
involved the purchaser of a decedent's traveling bag who, five years after buying
it, found money concealed under its lining. The purchaser-finder spent part of
the money and banked the rest. At the trial, he vainly relied on the Statute.
In affirming, the court stated that actionable conversion occurred when he fouind
and used the money.
As to whether the Statute runs for a finder who fails to comply with the
estray statute (or lost goods statute) the cases disagree. Non-compliance has been
held an insufficient conversion to start the Statute. Andrews v. Carl, 77 Vt. 172,
59 At. 167 (1904). Contra: Havird v. Lung 19 Idaho 790, 115 Pac. 930 (1911)
(added dictum: finder's concealment of chattel, and owner's ignorance of its
location, would not toll Statute. Quaere.) The better view seems to be that
successful concealment by the finder prevents the Statute running. Quimby v.
Blackey 63 N. H. 77 (1884) (finder hid lost purse; Statute tolled); Note, 43 HAtv.
L. REv. 471 (1930); Gatlin v. Vaut, 6 Ind. T. 254, 91 S.W. 38 (1906); Chilton v.
Carpenter, 78 Okla., 210, 189 Pac. 747 (1920) (and cases cited); Commercial Union
Ins. Co. v. Connolly, 183 Minn. 1,235 N.W. 634 (1931); cf. Woodcliff Gin Co. v.
Kittes, 173 Ga. 661, 161 S.E. 119 (1931) and Watts v. Millikin's Estate, 95 Vt.
335, 115 Atl. 150 (1921). Contra: 1 WALSH, COMMENTARIES ON PROPERTr § 27 n.

7 (and cases cited).

e. John A. Murrell (also spelled Murrel or Murel), born in 1804, a notorious

murderer, outlaw, gang leader and conspirator, operated in eastern Arkansas,
Tennessee, and reputedly from New York to Texas, was convicted and branded
at Nashville in 1832 as a horse thief, later organized a projected Negro Rebellion,

and disappeared shortly before the Civil War. See "John A. Murrel's Own Story,"
in WALTON, AUGUSTUS Q, A HISTORY OF THE DErEcrioN, CONVIcTION, LIFE Am

A. MUREL, THE GREAT WESTERN LAND PIRATE (Athens, Tenn.,
republished by G. White, 1835) as quoted in BoTK N, A TREASURY OF SOUTHERN
FOLKLORE, 221 et seq. (New York, Crown Publishers, 1949); COATES, ROBERT M.,
THE OrrLAW YEARS 169-302 (1930) Cf. MAR TWAIN, LIFE ON THE MIssIssIPPi
DESIGNS OF JOHN

p. 311 (1883) ("Jesse James was a retail rascal; Murel, wholesale.").
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1951
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person who found it without violence or breach of peace and without being,
as against the outlaw, a trespasser on the premises while finding it.10 This
question is not before the court in the present suit.
10. It is generally stated that even a thief has title as against strangers.
In so far as this means that a thief may defend his continued possession against
subsequent stranger-trespassers seeking to wrest the res from him, it is unquestionably correct, this rule being adopted not out of consideration for the thief, but
in the public interest, to discourage pillage and avoid bloodshed; as otherwise
each successive taker from the thief would in turn have become a fair target
tempting the violent and crafty, and a misapplication of the general rule that a bona
fide purchaser from a thief gets only the title the thief had, might have similarly
exposed such purchasers. Where, however, the thief hides his loot, on premises
to which he has neither title nor possession, and thereafter remains out of possession of the locus, the law need not require that one peaceably finding the loot
and carrying it off must surrender it to the thief upon later demand. Although
the peaceable finder be a trespasser, he is not trespassing against the thief, as the
latter. has no possession to be invaded.f Concededly, termination of a finder's
possession does not necessarily mean abandonment. A finder who thereafter loses
the article may thus recover it from a still later finder although the latter's taking
possession involved no trespass.g
f. In Rexroth v. Coon, 15 R. I. 35, 23 At. 37 (1885), A without permission
placed A's empty bee box on B's land, intending to return for future honey from
bees not A's. C, also without permission, opened the box and took the honey.
A vainly brought trover against C for the honey. Accord: State v. Repp, 104
Iowa 305, 73 N.W. 829 (1898) (larceny prosecution). Cf. Lawrence v. Buck, 62
Me. 275 (1874). That title to animals ferae naturae cannot be gained by a trespasser reducing them to possession, as against the owner of the land where found
and taken, see Gratz v. McKee, 270 Fed. 713, 719 ( C. C. A. 8th 1921) (case
arising in Missouri), reversed on another ground, McKee v. Gratz, 260 U. S. 127
(1922). Accord: Goff v. Kilts, 15 Wend. 550, 552 (N. Y. 1836) (dictum).
As to whether trespasser starting an animal on A's land but killing it on B's land
would get title, compare Blades v. Higgs, 11 H. of L. Cas. 621, 3 Eng. Rul.
Cas. 76 (1865) with Sutton v. Moody, 1 Ld. Raym. 250, 91 Eng. Rep. 1063
(1697). But the foregoing cases did not involve a res which the trespasser had
brought with him to another's land. See Francis, Three Cases on Possession
-Some Further Observations, 14 ST. Louis L. Rav. 11, 21 (1928), reprinted
in FRYER, READINGS ON PERSONAL PROPERTY, 85, 93 (3d Ed. 1938): "Suppose a
thief steals my silver and buries it in your land. As between the thief and the
finder the thief has possession." See Comm. v. Rourke, 64 Mass. 397 (1852).
In Carden v. Swagger, 158 Ark. 640, 238 S.W. 31 (1922) the administrator
of a deceased convicted bank robber was denied recovery against a hunter who
picked up the loot in the forest where the robber had thrown it while fleeing from
arresting officers. That the finder of stolen loot is guilty of larceny if, although
ignorant of the identity of both the true owner and the thief, he takes such loot
with the intent of converting it to his own use and depriving the unknown owner
of it, Commonwealth v. Dearolf, 1 Pa. Dist. 543 (1892) is entirely consistent
with cases denying civil redress to the thief against the later finder. The larcenous
finder of previously stolen goods intends to deprive the true owner of his property;
but finders who, like Tom and Huck, publicly announce their discovery, are not
guilty of such intent. Moreover, the goods were not in the possession of the.
absconded thief, which distinguishes such cases of theft from the first thief's possessions as Ward v. Peo., 3 Hill 395 (N. Y. 1842), aff'd, 6 Hill 144 (Ct. of Errors,
1843).
g. Deaderick v. Oulds, 86 Tenn. 14, 5 S.W. 487 (1887); Clark v. Maloney,
3 Harr. 68 (Del. circa 1839); Cummings v. Stone, 13 Mich. 70 (1864); Lawrence
v. Buck, 62 Me. 275 (1874) (alternative holding).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol16/iss1/7
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Tom and Huck entered the haunted house in search of buried treasure.
This, in itself, gave Tom and Huck no property rights, nor did their subsequent eye-witnessing of the finding of the buried coins by Injun Joe and
the ragged man. Injun Joe and his companion, in digging a hole to bury
certain silver coins- they had stolen, fortuitously struck the buried chest.
They exhumed it, discovered that it was filled with gold coins, and took
it and its contents with them. Injun Joe and the ragged man were thus
joint finders and were, as against others having neither better nor equal
right, entitled to the gold coins unless the English doctrine of treasure
trove applies.

The buried gold coins, having been found concealed beneath the hearth,
come within the accepted definitions of treasure trove.1 2 Under the English
law, treasure trove belonged to the Crown, not to the finder nor to the
owner of the locus in quo.h This State has received such of the English
11. $00 (p. 184). These silver coins are not involved in this suit. They
were in a bag. The gold was in a box or chest. It is not stated that the silver
was put inside the box, nor that silver was found in the cave.
12. Treasure trove consisted of gold or silver coin, plate or bullion, (and
probably, gold or silver metal other than unmined ore) concealed in the earth,
or. within the walls of a building or other structure, and later found, the owner
being unknown. See 3 COKE, INST. 132. The requirement that the finding be in
a private place, sometimes mentioned, seems merely to have distinguished the
basis of the Crown's claim. Similarly, gold and silver ore in situ belonged to the
Crown. 3 COKE, INST. 132.
h. In the Roman law, treasure trove found by the landowner was awarded
entirely to him; if accidentally found in private land by another person, half was
awarded to the finder, half to the landowner; if similarly found in public land,
half went to the public treasury, half to the finder. If, however, the finder was
intentionally searching for treasure trove without the permission of the landowner,
or. if, after finding, the finder concealed all or part of his find, the entire treasure
went to the landowner. JUSTINIAN, INSTITUTES, lib. II, tit. I (39) (Moyle translation, 5th ed. 1913); 2 Scorr, THE CIVIL LAw 40 (Inst. II, tit. I (30)) (1932);
15 id. p. 100 (Codex, lib. X, tit. XV); 17 id. p. 251 (Emperor Leo, New Constitution
LI). Cf. Emden, The Law of Treasure Trove, Past and Present, 42 L. Q. REV. 368
(1926).
Whether or not, as declared by some writers, the English law originally
awarded treasure trove to the finder, 3 COKE, INsT. 132; 2 HOLDSwORTH, HisT. ENG.
LAW p. 273 (3d ed. 1927) (citing Bracton); Emden, The Law of Treasure Trove,
Past and Present, 42 L. Q. REV. 368, 375 (quoting the Laws of Henry I, circa 1118),
from very early times treasure trove was held to belong to the king. BRITrON pp.
14, 56 (Nichols trans. 1901 ed.); 3 COKE, INST. 132; 2 HoLDswoRTm, HisT. ENG.
LAw p. 273 (3d ed. 1927); 2 KENT, COMM. *357. In the middle of the eighteenth
century the hereditary treasures of the Crown, including treasure trove, were surrendered by the King to public purposes in return for a fixed annual income. Emden,
The Law of Treasure Trove, Past and Present, 42 L. Q. REV. 368, 38 (1926).
As Missouri received only such of the English law as was made "prior to the
Fourth year of the reign of James the First" [Mo. REV. STAT. 378 (1835)], English
laws enacted subsequent to March 24, 1606 were not received, hence the surrender of the Crown prerogative would have no effect in Missouri in any event.
See Foster v. Fidelity Safe Deposit Co., 162 Mo. App. 165, 169, 145 S.W.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1951
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common law, including statutes of general application, existing before
March 24, 1606, as are not repugnant to nor inconsistent with the Missouri
and Federal constitutions and applicable statutes thereunder.ls No express
abolition of the doctrine of treasure trove appears in our law, but it is so
inconsistent with the spirit of our free institutions that it has no proper
14

application here.

1

Next, the question arises whether the finaer is entitled to these gold
coins as against the owner of the haunted house. The house owner has
not appeared nor made claim, but the applicable rule seems clear. Under
one view, the owner of land is entitled to things found therein or thereonj
13. Mo. Rav. STAT. p. 378 (1835).
14. Or, put another way, since we have no king, the State of Missouri succeeds to the rights of the sovereign. No case has been called to our attention
where any American state has asserted a right to treasure trove. In 1801 the State
of New York re-enacted the statute of 4 EDW. I, directing the coroner to inquire
by coroner's jury as to any such treasure reported found, and to ascertain the
finders and bind them to appear in court. N. Y. Laws, 24th Sess. c. 43, reprinted
in N. Y. REv. LAWS p. 150 (1813). No cases have been found applying this Act,
and the New York Revised Statutes of 1829 omitted it entirely.
139, 141 (1912), aff'd 264 Mo. 89, 174 S.W. 376 (1915), where the court, after
citing two cases from other states that the finder of treasure trove prevails as against
the owner of the locus, distinguishes those cases on their facts, the Missouri case
not involving concealed goods.
i. Gillilan v. Gillilan, 278 Mo. 99, 212 S.W. 348, 350 (1919) ("Primogeniture is contrary to the theory upon which this and other commonwealths were
built"). And see Hawkinson v. Johnston, 122 F. 2d 724, 728 (C.C.A. 8th, 1941),
cert. denied, 314 U. S. 365 (1941).

j. In Missouri a non-trespassing finder of truly lost goods prevails over the
landowner, where finding is in a place open to the public. Hoagland v. Forest
Park Highlands Amusement Co., 170 Mo. 335, 70 S.W. 878, 94 Am. St. Rep. 740
(1902). Accord: Bridges v. Hawkesworth, 21 L.J.Q.B. 75 (1851). Several courts,
including those of Missouri, give the landowner a superior right to possession of
inislaid property, as against the finder, even though the latter is a non-trespasser.
Foster v. Fidelity Safe Deposit Co., 162 Mo. App. 165, 145 S.W. 139 (1912),
afflrmed 264 Mo. 89, 174 S.W. 376 (1915); State ex rel. Scott v. Buzzard, 235 Mo.
App. 636, 144 S.W. 2d 847 (1940) (employee finding -money concealed within
wall, held not entitled thereto; mislaid rather than lost). See also Elwes v. Brigg
Gas Co., 33 Ch.D. 562 (1886) (lessor prevailed against lessee-finder who uncovered an ancient embedded boat), expressly followed in Allred v. Biegel, 219 S.W.
665 (Mo. App. 1949) (reversioner of land entitled to ancient Indian boat exposed
by erosion of river bank, as against "finder" and life tenant and termor; boat held
to be part of the realty) and in Ferguson v. Ray, 44 Ore. 557, 77 Pac. 600 (1904).
The latter holding is approved in Jackson v. Steinberg, 186 Ore. 129, 200 p. 2d 376
(1948), rehearing denied, 186 Ore. 129, 205 P. 2d. 562 (1949). See also Goddard
v. Winchell, 86 Iowa 71, 52 N.W. 1124, 17 L.R.A. 788 (1892) (meteorite); Oregon
Iron Co. v. Hughes, 47 Ore. 313, 81 Pac. 572 (1905).
With the exception of Jackson v. Steinberg, all of the last six cited cases
could have been rested on the ground that the thing "found" was an unsevered
portion of the realty. Jackson v. Steinberg rested in part on the fact that the
finder was an employee of the land occupier and was acting in the course of employment when finding the money, and in part on the reserved or private nature
of the portion of the hotel premises in which the thing was found.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol16/iss1/7
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by trespassers, 15 but some courts might except from this doctrine situations
in which the landowner was not in possession of the premises either in person
or through another. Other courts might distinguish cases in which, by
reason of persons customarily resorting to the particular unoccupied land
without consent being sought or given and without objection raised, an implied license could be inferred.k A special exception is sometimes made as to
things answering the description of treasure trove.1 Injun Joe was a murderer, ghoul, perjurer, robber, conspirator, and fugitive but his trespass against
the haunted house was peaceable; he did not enter violently nor prevent
the landowner from exercising possession over the house. As the landowner was ignorant of the hidden treasure and was not exercising any
factual control over the premises nor seeking to exclude persons therefrom,
he cannot assert a claim superior to that which Injun Joe and the ragged
man have as finders. The finder should be protected under these circumstances, thus encouraging him to disclose his find to the appropriate authorities as required by law.16 Possibly Injun Joe and the ragged man removed
IS. Barker v. Bates, 13 Pick 255 (Mass. 1832).
16. Mo. REv. STAT. p. 397 (1835). Person finding money worth more than
$10, the owner being unknown, shall within ten days make affidavit thereof before
a justice of the peace. It was not suggested by any of the parties that this statute
applied only to lost property other than treasure trove.m
k. Cf. McKee v. Gratz, 260 U. S. 127 (1922), holding that a license may
be implied by the jury where there is a general custom of hunting on wild unenclosed land.
1. Some jurisdictions hold that the law of treasure trove has been merged
with the law of lost goods, and others continue to distinguish between them for
some purposes, but the later cases favor the finder of lost goods and, irrespective
of whether the two doctrines have been -merged, are at least equally favorable
toward the finder as to "treasure trove," as against the landowner. Vickery v.
Hardin, 77 Ind. App. 558, 133 N.E. 922, 923 (1922) (finder of treasure vs. former
owner of locus); Groover v. Tippins, 51 Ga. App. 47, 179 S.E. 634 (1935) (finder
versus owner of locus); Weeks v. Hackett, 104 Me. 264, 71 At. 858 (1908) (Suit
between two finders); Gaither v. Jones [Circuit Court of Baltimore, Md. 1935, as
quoted in WARREN, CASES ON PROPERTY 130-131 (2d ed. 1938)1; Danielson v.
Roberts, 44 Ore. 108, 74 Pac. 913 (1904); Roberson v. Ellis, 58 Ore. 219, 114 Pac.
110 (1911); Zornes v. Bowen, 223 Iowa 1141, 274 N.W. 877 (1937) (lessee's minor.
child finding buried money, prevailed against lessor); Zech v. Accola, 253 Wis.
80, 253 Wis. 80 33 N.W. 2d 232 (1948) (treasure trove concealed in chattel
bailed to finder; finder prevailed over bailor); Note, 22 CORN. L. Q. 263 (1936).
See Notes, 6 MINN. L. REv. 527 (1922) and 21 MicH. L. REv. 102 (1922), both
objecting to distinction whereby treasure trove went to the finder but other buried
property went to the owner of the locus.
Except for Groover v. Tippins and a dictum in the trial court decision of
Gaither v. Jones, the foregoing cases were not dealing with trespassing finders.
Might a distinction be taken between the innocent trespassing of a child and an
adult's wilful trespass? The latter would normally lose to the landowner. SALMOND,
JURISPRUDENCE 307 (7th ed. 1924).
m. A lost-property statute requiring persons "finding any money" to advertise for the owner, and awarding half the find to the county treasury if the owner
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1951
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these gold coins to the room near the temperance bar, but this is not proved
and is not material. Whether or not they first put the coins in the room,

the finders, or possibly Injun Joe alone, moved them to the cave where Tom
7
and Huck later found the coins buried.'

Tom and Huck did not find "treasure trove." The coins, if treasure trove

when found by Injun Joe, have been held to have become Injun Joe's and
the ragged man's as against persons having no better right. From that time
on, the coins were not treasure trove. Injun Joe's burial of them did not
restore that status, for the owner (i.e. the person entitled to possession as
against strangers) was not unknown. That Injun Joe died intestate without

heirs, before Tom and Huck found the coins, is insufficient to reconstitute
the coins treasure trove.,'
Finally, the question arises whether Injun Joe and the ragged man abandoned the coins. The ragged man died first, drowning while trying to escape
capture. Obviously, Injun Joe did not intend to abandon the coins when he
buried them, or he would have spared himself the trouble. Later, however,
17. Having heard Injun Joe say he would take the treasure to "my den
Number Two-under the cross. Number One is too common" (p. 186), Tom and
Huck decided that "Number Two" meant the tavern room (p. 190). Injun Joe
did use the room as a hideout (p. 193), and the room bore the number two (p.190),
but this seems sheer coincidence. As the room cached illicit liquor it was of more
"ccommon" resort than the remote recess of the cave where Tom later saw Injun
Joe and finally located the treasure
der the sign of the crors. Having concluded
that the cave was "Number Two" (p. 234), Tom and Huck presumably agree now
that the money was never in the tavern room (pp. 200, 208).
18. Moreover, if Injun Joe was entitled to the same rights as an ordinar
finder, the mere fact that he died intestate without heirs would not entitle subs
quent finders to keep the coins as against the public administrator. "He to whom
the property is, shall have treasure trove; and if he dies before it be foad, hi;
execstors shllI have it; for nothing accrues to the king unless when no one knowvs

who hid that treasure."

20 VINER's ABRIDGMENT

p. 414, para. 4 (2d ed. 1793),

citing BRACTON 120a, lib. 3, cap. 3, f. 4. Conceivably, goods might be treasure
troven where demonstrably hidden by a named person centuries earlier who was
otherwise unknown to history and unconnected with any living person. 0
did not appear, was held not to apply to treasure trove, it being hidden rather
than lost. Sovern v. Yoran, 16 Ore. 269, 20 Pac. 100 (1888). Accord: Zech v.

Accola, 253 Wis. 80, 33 N.W. 2d 232 (1948) (concurring opinion dissents hereon),
Noted (1949) Wis. L. REv. 393; Foster v. Fidelity Safe Deposit Co., 162 Mo. App.
165, 145 S.W. 139, 141 (1912) stated that Missouri lost property statute did not

apply to mislaid goods. In affirming, the Missouri Supreme Court reiterated this.
Id, 264 Mo. 89 at 102, 174 S.W. 376 at 379 (1915).
n. Accord: Livermore v. White, 74 Me. 452, 456, 43 Am. Rep. 600 (1883).
o. "Doubtless extreme cases may be put. If treasure were dug up in a
field, so placed that it had been manifestly the property of the unknown man with
whose body it had been buried two centuries before, the public administrator might
not be entitled to the property. .. ." Gardner v. Ninety-Nine Gold Coins, 111 Fed.
552, 554 (D. Mass. 1899). But cf. 25 A.B.A.J. 871 (1939) boat thought to be
tomb of Kind Redwald, dead a thousand years).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol16/iss1/7
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when he found his exit boarded up, and thereafter as he worked vainly and
until death in an effort to get out of the cave, he certainly did give up all
intention of returning for the coins. Accordingly, Tom and Huck later became entitled as joint finders, 19 and nothing that happened subsequently has
reduced or defeated their rights.20 Judgment affirmed.
MoAKEs, J (concurring specially): I agree with my brother Doakes that

the judgment must be affirmed, but I prefer to rely on the broader proposition that the only facts actually established are that Tom and Huck found
19. As between Tom and Huck, they were clearly co-finders. They were
together when they first learned of the gold, and were at all times intending to
share it when they should acquire it. Thus, Huck's vigil outside the mysterious
tavern room was on behalf of himself and Tom. Tom discovered the mark of the
cross but did not see the gold or know its exact location before bringing Huck
into the cave with him. Tom, digging into the cavern floor, struck boards which
Huck then helped uncover. Tom was first to enter the aperture disclosed by the
raising of the boards, and first saw the chest, but Huck was an equal participant
and may, indeed, have been the first to touch the coins themselves. Regardless
of his last point, they were co-finders.P Huck need not rely on any contractual
arrangement, so Tom's ability to disaffirm contracts would be of no avail. Nor
can Tom's guardian by asserting Tom's disability, deprive Huck of the latter's
status as co-finder. McDougal, assuming that he is still the owner of the cave's
mouth, has thereby no ownership of the gold. First of all, the gold was probably
found under another's landq (as Tom's secret entrance was 5 miles from the valley
containing the cave mouth). If so, Tom in finding the gold, was not trespassing
on McDougal's land as Tom used a secret entrance near the cache (p. 232).r
20. Tom "hooked" Benny Taylor's little wagon to carry the bags of coin
(p. 237). This gave Benny no rights in the coins. As owner of the wagon he remained entitled to its possession, but he never had possession of the coins nor
did they become a part of his wagon by accession or otherwise.
As Tom and Huck neared the village, a Mr. Jones took the wagon (p. 237)
and pulled it the rest of the way into town, leaving it outside Mrs. Douglas' house
(p. 238) where a surprise reception awaited Tom. As Mr. Jones was merely
helping the boys with their heavy load, and as he did not take the wagon out of
their presence, he was not even a bailee of the wagon, but merely had custody
of it. As he did not have possession of the wagon, he did not have possession of
the coins, independently of his lack of knowledge that the coins existed. Therefore, the question of where one may be a bailee of chattels of whose presence in a
given receptacle he is unaware, does not arise. Tom and Huck as finders would
have prevailed over Mr. Jones even if the latter had wrested the coins from them
with intent ot keep them for himself, or even if, having become their bailee of the
coins, Jones had thereafter misappropriated the coins. Armory v. Delamirie,

1 Strange 505 (1722).

p. Cummings v. Stone, 13 Mich. 70 (1864), reprinted in FRYER, READINGS ON
PERSONAL PROPERTY 71 (3d ed. 1938); Weeks v. Hackett, 104 Me. 264, 71 Atl. 858
(1908); Keron v. Cashman, 33 Atl. 1055 (N. J. Chancery, 1896); Danielson v.
Roberts, 44 Ore. 108, 74 Pac. 913 (1904). Flood v. City National Bank, 220
Iowa 935, 263 N.W. 321 (1935) is clearly distinguishable, as it involved two persons acting independently.
q. Cf. Marengo Cave Co. v. Ross, 7 N.E. 2d 59 (Ind. App. 1937), superseded
by id., 212 Ind. 624, 10 N.E. 2d 917 (1937).
r. Not being buried in the cave by an unknown person, the coins were not
treasure trove as regards that deposit. See note 18, supra.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1951
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the coins buried in a cave in this State; that no lawful owner, and no other
person having rights equal or superior to those of Tom or Huck in such
coins, has appeared or been established; and that the evidence was insufficient to prove that Injun Joe ever had these coins in his possession, lawful or otherwise. 21 Many of the foregoing statements by my brother Doakes
are, therefore, dicta. In addition, he seems to have misinterpreted the facts
in one particular. A person trying desperately to claw through a barred
door and thus escape starvation probably reaches the point where his only
mental attitude is the desire to escape. To this extent, he may have "no
intention to return." On the other hand, he does not affirmatively intend
"not to return," and the court cannot know that Injun Joe intended not
to return for the coins. Rather, the intent to return was merely dwarfed or
overshadowed by the frantic urge to escape. Even if, in his dying moments,
Injun Joe resolved never to return (a fact not shown), there might be a
question whether he was rational enough to have the requisite animus.
Although he never left the cave, Injun Joe reached a point several miles from
his cache, and would effectually have abandoned the coins if possessing the
necessary intention.
OAKEs, J: I concur with my brother Doakes in his result, and with my
brother Moakes in part of his reasoning, but am not entirely agreed with
either one. Regarding the question of whether Injun Joe abandoned the
coins, I agree with my brother Moakes that he did not. Moreover, the
ragged man was not imprisoned in the cave and did not intend to give up
his share.22 On the other hand, even though the evidence does not compel
21. Tom and Huck saw Injun Joe take a chest out of the fireplace of the
haunted house, but they do not know that this is the same chest they found or that
Injun Joe put it in the cave. The supposition that Injun Joe put this chest in
the cave is insufficiently supported by proved facts to be compelling.
22. Although Injun Joe and the ragged man were "joint finders," this does
not mean they were joint tenants.8 That the ragged man pre-deceased Injun Joe
gave the latter no additional rights, the doctrine of survivorship (jus accrescendi)
being inapplicable. That the ragged man fled to avoid capture does not establish
that he intended to abandon all claim to the gold coins.
s. See Sovem v. Yoran, 16 Ore. 269, 20 Pac. 100 (1888); Weeks v. Hackett,
supra, note p, holding parties were "joint finders and therefore tenants in common"
of coins; and other cases cited in note p. Very little attention has been given
to the precise type of co-ownership involved, the actual problem having been coownership versus sole ownershop. Thus, Aigler, Righrts of Finders, 21 Mici. L.
Ray. 664 (1923), says "such possession may be acquired by two or more concurrently, in which case they are tenants in common" and cites in support Keron v.
Cashman as illustrating a judicial tendency to avoid difficult fact questions as to
which person reduced the res to possession, by holding them to be "joint finders."
The common law presumption favoring joint tenancy, applied not only to
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol16/iss1/7
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a finding that the gold coins Tom and Huck found were those Injun Joe had
found at the haunted house, it unquestionably is sufficient to support that
finding of the trial court. Not being clearly unreasonable or contrary to
the evidence, that finding is binding upon this court. Moreover, Tom and
Huck saw Injun Joe find a chest containing gold coins; heard him say he
would take it "to my den.., at Number Two-Under the cross"; dug for it
in a hideout where Tom had seen Injun Joe and which answered the description; and found a chest of gold coins there. It seems certain that Injun
Joe buried the latter chest there. Probably it was the same chest Injun
Joe found in the haunted house, but whether they are identical is immaterial.

transfers of real property, but also to transfers of chattels real or chattels personal.
Littleton illustrated this rule by stating that a horse given to many would become
the sole property of the survivor. Lir. LiB. 3, cap. 3, § 281. Later. authorities are
in accord. I CoKE, INST. *736 (15th ed. 1794); 2 BL. COMM. *399 (Cooley, 1871).
Moreover, the rule that co-disseisors would acquire title as joint tenants, 1 COKE,
INST. *730, should apply to chattels adversely co-held. But the common law
preference for joint tenancy has been widely reversed by statutes substituting a
preference for tenancy in common. In this State, the Statute now and at the time
of the instant suit, provided, "Every interest in real estate, granted or devised
to two or more persons other than to executors and trustees as such, shall be a
tendency in common, unless expressly declared in such grant, or devise, to be
in joint tenancy." Mo. REV. STAT. p. 119 (1835). Another section defines "real
estate" as meaning "land-and embracing all chattels real." Id. p. 124, § 39. In
Diehm v. Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Company, 129 Mo. App. 256, 108
S.W. 139 (1908), it was stated that this statute dealt only with grants and devises
of real property, hence did not regulate interests in life insurance policies, but
the court, largely in reliance on the equally inapplicable statute preventing lapse
of devises to children of the testator who predecease him and leave issue surviving,
applied as the presumed intent of the contracting parties a rule that no lapse or
jus accrescendi were to arise. If the statutory reversal of the common law preference for joint tenancies is not applicable to chattels [See WALSH, COMMENTARIES, p.
6 favoring contra view] and, in addition, is not applied to them by analogy, Injun
Joe and the ragged man would have been joint tenants, and the prior death of
the ragged man would have left Injun Joe the exclusive holder of whatever rights
the two had formerly held together. Cf. Act of January 19, 1816, 1 Mo. Terr. Laws,
p. 436 § 2 "The doctrine of survivorship in cases of joint tenants shall never be
allowed in this territory."
The common law rule that joint disseisors acquired their. adverse possession
title as joint tenants is presumably the rule even today. "A statutory provision that
a conveyance or devise to two or more persons shall prima facie create tenancy
in common can obviously have no application" [to title acquired by adverse possession]. 2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 422 (3d ed. 1939). This would seem to
have made Injun Joe a sole possessor if he and the ragged man had acquired
adverse possession title before the ragged man died. Intuitively, such result seems
wrong. Quaere: Did the common law preference for joint tenancy, even though
applied to chattels real and ordinary chattels personal, extend to money and fangible
chattels which (unlike a horse, cow or wagon) were readily partible. Chattels
personal were relatively unimportant in mediaeval English law, and the incidental
extension of joint tenancy to them need not require its further extension to fungibles.
That a joifit tenancy can readily be created where a third person holds fungibles
for two or more beneficiaries, or expressly transfers to them as joint tenants, is
not decisive.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1951
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I would award the coins to Tom and Huck because they found them when
they were not in the possession of any one else. Neither Injun Joe nor the
ragged man remained in possession of the coins, nor in actual nor constructive possession of the premises. As to the cave, Injun Joe was as much a
trespasser as Tom and Huck were, if, indeed, they were not all implied
licensees.
PER CuiAm. We are agreed that the objection raised by the intervenor,

Finn, does not require modification of the judgment below. As Finn was
Huck's lawful father, he would normally be Huck's natural guardian entitled to the custody of Huck and Huck's estate. 23 The county court, however, has jurisdiction to appoint a guardian for a minor whose parent is
adjudged incompetent or unfit for the duties of guardian.2 4 Widow Douglas
and Judge Thatcher petitioned to replace Finn as Huck's guardian. Although
an unfamiliar judge at first denied the application z r he became better acquainted with Finn later.26 Intervenor Finn brought an action to recover
the money27 and was defeated.28 The record indicates that Finn has been
displaced as guardian. Moreover, Finn did not prosecute his appeal and it
appears that he is dead.29 This renders moot the question of Finn's rights,
not only because Huck is Finn's sole heir, but because a guardian's right
to control assets is not inheritable through him qusa guardian nor succeeded
to by his own administrator.

23. Mo. REV.
Id., § 2.

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

STAT.

p. 293, § 1 (1835).

TWAIN, ADVENTURES OF HUCKLEBERRY FINN

Id., p. 279.
Id., p. 280.
Id., p. 284.
Id., pp. 312, 591.
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